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 Among the most distinctive features of Southern African politics is the region’s 
preponderance of one-party dominant systems. Considerable effort has been made to explain 
the unusual phenomenon with some analysts emphasizing the potential of such imbalances of 
power to undermine the effectiveness of a democracy’s institutions. However, political 
science has only just begun to study the repercussions the status quo may have for political 
culture in the region. Using survey data collected across the continent, this paper shifts the 
focus to this unexplored link between dominance and culture, aiming to shed some light on 
the relationship by studying the effect dominant party systems have on three specific political 
attitudes in Africa: demand for democracy, evaluation of the supply of democracy, and 
pluralism. 
 The academic literature on Southern Africa’s dominant party systems has produced a 
theoretical distinction between two types of dominance. On the one hand is simple 
dominance, characterized only by long-term electoral success by a single party. On the other 
hand is dominance by parties who emerged from national liberation movements. Some 
analysts have argued that the ideological orientation of liberation parties and their unique 
claim to the right to rule renders them incompatible with essential features of democracy. 
This paper investigates the possibility that these distinct varieties of dominance have distinct 
effects on political attitudes. 
 The results of the analyses conducted here offer strong evidence that dominant party 
systems do have implications for mass attitudes. Further, this research finds strong support 
for the argument that the nature of a party’s dominance matters, as means comparisons and 
regression analyses showed that the effects of dominance on popular attitudes were 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Research Problem and Significance
Democracy’s emergence in Southern Africa was a long time in coming. Late 
decolonization in Angola and Mozambique and stubborn white minority rule in South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe forced the region down a winding and difficult path toward 
liberation and inclusive government. Even after its eventual and incremental arrival, the 
region’s collective experience with democracy has been distinctive. Perhaps the single most 
unusual characteristic of national politics in these countries is that elections have not yet 
produced a single transfer of executive authority between parties.  
Political scientists typically regard this sort of one-party dominance (OPD) as a rare 
state of affairs,1 but even following more than half a century of study of dominant party 
systems across the globe, the discipline has not yet produced a consensus on the causes or 
effects of these outlier party systems. This failure is, at least in part, a product of substantial 
disagreements within the literature. Foundational works on the topic of OPD fundamentally 
disagree on matters as essential as what exactly constitutes “dominance” and whether or not 
OPD countries, however defined, should be eligible for designation as democratic.2  
One trait the scholarly contributions on OPD do share is a focus on finding and 
describing the ways by which OPD systems emerge and are sustained. The most influential 
investigations of the phenomenon have found that factors like success in the politicization of 
state resources,3 macroeconomic conditions, and even simple dumb luck4 are important in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 1. 
2 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development Political Institutions and Well-Being 
in the World, 1950–1990, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27. 
3 Kenneth Greene, "The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance,” 
Comparative Political Studies, (43: 2010), 808. 
4 Pempel, 335. 
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explaining how, upon occasion, parties just do not lose elections. Some of these pieces of 
work also considered the institutional ramifications of protracted rule by a single party.5 
The ascendance of liberation parties like the ANC in South Africa over the course of 
the last two-plus decades has sparked interest in the study of OPD in the context of Southern 
Africa. One of the most interesting developments in the research to-date has been the 
articulation of a theoretical distinction between the handful OPD systems in which the 
dominant party is closely associated with that country’s national liberation movement (NLM) 
and systems in which the dominant party is not. The distinction is rooted in party ideology. 
Roger Southall offers a concise cross-national description of the unique ideological character 
of liberation parties, arguing that the ruling parties in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe 
all “[espouse] monopoly power of the liberation” and believe that their right to govern is 
guaranteed indefinitely by their central role in their nation’s history.6  
There has also been research on the consequences that single-party dominance may be 
having on Southern Africa’s political systems. For example, Anthony Butler analyzed the 
impacts of ANC dominance in South Africa and argued that the party’s staying power has 
likely had both positive and negative effects on the country’s democratic institutions.7 
However, the literature has yet to fully explore the implications the region’s dominant party 
systems may have for political culture; the effect that living in a dominant-party system is 
having on popular attitudes remains unknown. Further, no effort has been made to measure 
the potential discrete effects of living in a political system that is dominated by a liberation 
party. 
An investigation of the effects OPD party system types have on popular attitudes in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy, 
(Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), xvii. 
6 Roger Southall, Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa, 
(Pietermaritzburg: KwaZulu-Natal University Press, 2013), 343. 
7 Anthony Butler, “Considerations on the Erosion of One-Party Dominance,” Representation, 
(45:2009), 164. 
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Southern Africa will yield findings that supplement existing explanations of how and why 
OPD systems exist and persist. In addition, knowledge of the relationship between types of 
party systems and attitudes will shed light on the implications OPD party systems may have 
for the bigger questions of democratic consolidation in the region.   
II. Research Question
To the extent that one-party dominant systems erode democracy, is the impact felt 
only through the behavior of elites, or do such systems also (re)shape the attitudes of ordinary 
citizens? Further, does dominance by former liberation movements have its own added 
effect?  
III. State of Knowledge
There is virtually no scholarship that has focused on investigating the effect OPD and 
NLM party-dominant party systems have on popular political attitudes. Instead, much of the 
research on OPD has attempted to explain how such unusual systems come to be and identify 
the reasons the systems are able to persist in the face of circumstances that typically produce 
transfers of power in other democracies. Little attention has been paid to systematically 
investigating the relationship between party systems and political culture in general or 
specific attitudes in particular. However, much has been written about other kinds of impacts 
OPD may have on the political systems. In addition, the literature has produced a theoretical 
distinction between types of OPD systems that is especially important to future work on the 
phenomenon in Southern Africa and shapes the approach taken in this analysis. 
A. The Consequences of One-Party Dominant Party Systems
The study of party systems types was pioneered by Maurice Duverger, whose best-
known contribution to political science is his eponymous “law” that elegantly connects a 
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political system’s institutions with the number of parties it is likely to support.8 Years later 
Giovanni Sartori coined the term “predominant party system,” providing analysts with a 
theoretical basis from which to begin empirical research of the rare phenomenon that is 
OPD.9 
 Among the first and most prominent cross-national investigations of OPD systems 
was T.J. Pempel’s Uncommon Democracies. Pempel’s volume examined dominance in the 
cases of Israel, Japan, Sweden, and Italy. In contrast to this paper, Pempel’s analysis focused 
mostly on identifying the causes of OPD across seemingly different cases. However, one of 
the most important factors Pempel argues is behind dominant parties’ success is, in effect, 
also a product of dominance. Dominant parties’ persistence, Pempel suggests, is partly 
explained by the parties’ ability to find ways to “reshape the country’s politics and 
society…[allowing] the dominant party to remake the country in its own image…” helping 
the party cement a long-term electoral advantage.10 For Pempel, “remaking” refers to the 
potential for a dominant party to use “public policy choices to…shift the ideological balance 
in society.”11 The author cites the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s use of policy to 
produce a massive increase in the number of union members in post-WWII Sweden as an 
example of a dominant party using its control of the instruments of government to establish 
ideological hegemony by growing its base of supporters and “isolate its enemies.”12 
 Pempel is far from the only analyst who has concluded dominant party systems have 
important implications for societies. In their 1999 edition, Hermann Giliomee and Charles 
Simkins argue that OPD enables and perhaps even causes antidemocratic behavior among 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, 
(London: Methuen & Co, 1959), 217. 
9 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 192. 
10 Pempel, 336. 
11 Ibid., 352. 
12 Ibid., 352-3. 
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elites actors within political systems. When parties do not face a realistic threat of losing 
power, dominant parties are freer to take steps to consolidate their power in ways that 
undermine the effectiveness of democratic institutions.13 Implicit in their argument that 
dominance constitutes a state of insulation from shifts in the electorate is the belief that 
popular support for dominant parties is not contingent upon their delivery of political goods. 
In other words, in their description of the impacts of OPD on institutions, Giliomee and 
Simkins make an important and testable assumption about mass attitudes in OPD party 
systems. 
 There are also findings in research outside the narrow scope of the study OPD that 
address questions similar to the one posed in this paper. Research on party systems of sub-
Saharan Africa in general has shown evidence that a country’s party system may in fact have 
a measurable effect on levels of democracy. A 2005 study by Kuenzi and Lambright found a 
modest positive association between an index measuring the competitiveness of a country’s 
party system14 and that country’s Polity rating.15 A later study on the party systems of sub-
Saharan Africa from Basedau reached a similar conclusion, albeit even more tentatively, 
suggesting that “moderate fragmentation” in party systems16 has a weak but significant 
positive relationship with liberal democracy as measured by Freedom House ratings.17 Work 
like this supports the contention that party systems indeed have measurable consequences for 
institutions but the implications for popular attitudes remain unexplored.  
B. The One-Party Dominant Party Systems of Southern Africa and Their Effects 
 Collectively, the countries of Southern Africa violate the literature’s expectation that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Giliomee, 350. 
14 Competitiveness measured using seat-total volatility and fractionalization indices. 
15 Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in 
Africa’s Electoral Regimes,” Party Politics, (11:2005), 436; 439. 
16 Gero Erdmann and Matthias Basedau, “Party systems in Africa: Problems of categorising 
and explaining party systems,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies (26:2008), 118. 
17 Ibid., 133. 
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dominant-party systems are unusual. In academic writing, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are among the countries frequently described as 
currently having OPD party systems. Before the emergence of the Patriotic Front (PF) in 
2011, Zambia was also often regarded as a OPD system and future studies might add Angola 
to the list of OPD countries if the MPLA continues to post large margins of victory at the 
ballot box. In contrast to Pempel’s explanation of OPD, the large number of cases of 
dominant-party systems in Southern Africa is not the result of the chance confluence of 
structural circumstance, party capacity, and luck. Rather, the region’s historical experience 
with settler colonialism is at the heart of many of its cases of OPD. In much of Southern 
Africa, electoral democracy was the culmination of national liberation movements (NLMs). 
Leading struggle organizations became parties and the broad coalitions they had built over 
the preceding decades became overwhelming and lasting voting blocs. Indeed, this particular 
path to dominance distinguishes OPD as it exists in much of Southern Africa from examples 
of the phenomenon elsewhere. 
 The distinction may not be a mere historical one; a number of scholars of the region’s 
politics have contended that liberation party dominance in Southern Africa is made special by 
an underlying “liberation” ideology which shapes the parties and, potentially, the political 
systems themselves. Southall, writing about NLM party-rule in Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe, argues that “the ideology of the [national democratic revolution] sits uneasily 
with democracy…because it ultimately espouses the monopoly power of the liberation 
movement as the vehicle of social progress: history without end!”18 NLM parties possess an 
“ambiguity” towards democracy, “welcoming [it] whilst espousing, in much ideology and 
practice, its contradiction.”19 Other observers have given similar accounts of liberation 
ideology. In her analysis of the ANC in South Africa, Nicola de Jager says the ANC 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Southall, 343.  
19 Ibid., 343. 
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considers itself the “vanguard” of a “national project of transformation,” a position which 
places the party “beyond scrutiny, and those that dare criticize them are labelled [by the 
ANC] as being ‘anti-transformation.’”20 In Namibia, du Pisani emphasizes SWAPO’s 
“founding myth,” which holds that the party is the nation’s “repository and custodian of 
democracy.”21 Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma maintain that Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF 
believes it possesses the right to remain in power forever after succeeding in overthrowing 
the Ian Smith regime.22 ZANU-PF’s past as a liberation movement, they argue, directly “led 
to the development of…distinctly anti-democratic political culture within the organisation.”23 
In each of these instances, researchers consistently argue that, for liberation movement 
parties in Southern Africa “the capture of state power marks…something similar to Francis 
Fukuyama’s ‘the end of history,’” and they believe they have earned the right to remain in 
power forever.24 
The potential consequences of this kind of ideology-infused dominance are being 
explored with particular focus on its ramifications for the vitality of democratic institutions. 
While the bulk of the literature concerns the negative effects of NLM party-dominance, there 
have been those who suggest that dominant-party systems have played a positive role in the 
consolidation of democracy.25 Anthony Butler observed that the ANC’s freedom from fear of 
losing power enabled them to “enforce an unpopular but necessary program of economic 
stabilization” that they could have ill-afforded to pursue in a more competitive party 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20Nicola de Jager, “South Africa: A Democracy in the Balance” in Friend or Foe?: Dominant 
Party Systems in Southern Africa, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT 
Press, 2013), 157-158. 
21 Andre du Pisani, “The Politics and Resource Endowment of Party Dominance in Namibia: 
The Past as the Present and the Future?” in Friend or Foe?: The Dominant Party Systems of 
Southern Africa, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 136. 
22 Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma, “Heroes Fall, Oppressors Rise: Democratic Decay 
and Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe,” in Friend or Foe?: Dominant Party Systems in 
Southern Africa, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 184. 
23 Ibid., 185. 
24 Ibid., 184. 
25 Butler, 159. 
 12 
system.26 He also suggests the party’s promotion of non-racialism played a pivotal role in 
preventing an escalation of racial and ethnic conflict in the country. Butler concisely summed 
up the literature’s ambivalence toward OPD in Southern Africa, concluding “liberation 
movement domination has been a necessary condition for the entrenchment of democratic 
practices and institutions, but it has also at the same time been a threat to them.”27  
 This “threat” to democratic institutions has been the subject of much of the research 
on the effects of liberation party dominance, but analysts have not yet produced a cross-
national account of how the threat would be realized. However, there have been some case-
specific findings. 
 In South Africa, Karen Ferree argues that the ANC has sustained its dominance by 
successfully delegitimizing opposition parties. The party, drawing on its hard-earned 
liberation credibility, has framed its opponents as racially exclusive, essentially 
characterizing them as counterrevolutionary by associating them with parties from the 
country’s apartheid-era.28 The party’s effort has largely succeeded in convincing many South 
Africa voters that they do not have a viable, inclusive alternative to the incumbent party, 
undermining elections’ potential to serve as a check on the ANC.29 In short, the ANC has 
worked to ensure that the country’s elections remain referenda on the project of national 
liberation and this approach to campaigning is largely consistent with liberation ideology as it 
is described above; opposition to the liberation party is conflated with opposition to 
liberation. 
 In Namibia, du Pisani describes the similar effect of liberation party dominance has 
had on the character of elections. Like the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO has used its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., 163. 
27 Ibid., 169. 
28 Karen Ferree, Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial Census 
Elections, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 118. 
29 Ibid., 52. 
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“discursive hegemony” in the country’s politics to capitalize on the party’s “narrative [that] 
connects [it] powerfully to the ushering in of a new political order,” maintaining that the 
party and the post-apartheid government “share a moral and historic assignation” that the 
party’s opponents can never match.30 
 Liberation party dominance has had more severe consequences in Zimbabwe. In the 
South African or Namibian cases, opposition parties, as marginalized and overmatched as 
they are, have been allowed to operate freely and their defeats are come as the result of fairly 
contested elections. This is not the case in Zimbabwe where ZANU-PF regards its political 
opponents as its “political enemies”31 and has used violent force to protect their grip on 
power.  
C. Summary of Findings in the Literature 
 Political science has not begun to explore the potential relationship between 
dominant-party systems and important popular attitudes like support for democracy and 
pluralism. However, a number of influential researchers have shown that party systems do 
have other kinds of ramifications for political systems. In Africa specifically, recent work has 
suggested that the historical experience of national liberation in Southern Africa yielded 
governing parties with enormous popular support as well as unique, deeply held ideas about 
their mandate. Analysts like Southall argue that elements of liberation ideology are at odds 
with the constraints on power that are essential to democracy, and even where elections are 
contested freely, dominant liberation parties have used their preeminent discursive position to 
marginalize opposition parties, casting them as fundamentally opposed to the project of 
national liberation. In the case of Zimbabwe, where electoral support for the liberation party 
has eroded significantly, this incongruence between ideology and democracy’s institutions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Ibid., 136. 
31 Britz, 178. 
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has resulted in substantial “democratic decay.”32  
 Important questions remain unaddressed. For one, the work on dominant-party 
systems in Southern Africa assumes that voters accept or agree with liberation parties’ claims 
that opposition parties are not viable alternatives to the incumbent party. However, it is not 
clear if dominant liberation parties are convincing voters that these opposition parties are 
counterrevolutionary or instead that any opposition to the governing party is intrinsically 
counterrevolutionary. In addition, the literature stresses the potential harm dominance poses 
to institutions. However, outside Zimbabwe such damage hasn’t materialized, with NLM 
party-dominant states like Namibia and South Africa routinely earning some of the 
continent’s highest ratings on measures of democracy.  
 The fact that hypothetical harms haven’t come to be does not necessarily mean that 
dominance by liberation parties is inconsequential. Indeed the field’s preoccupation with 
hypotheticals might be leaving some of the cultural impacts of NLM party-dominance that 
have come to pass mostly unexplored. For instance, does living in a political system where 
opposition is perpetually weak and portrayed as being on the wrong side of history affect 
voters’ attitudes about democracy and political opposition? This research will attempt to offer 
preliminary answers to some of these attitude-related questions. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Ibid., 171. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
This chapter will proceed in five sections. It will begin with an overview of the 
overall argument made in the paper and a brief discussion of how the argument emerges from 
existing work on OPD. The second section will articulate the core, testable hypotheses within 
the argument. Next, the chapter will define some key concepts that have important 
implications for case selection and classification. The fourth section of this chapter explains 
how abstract concepts in the paper’s argument will be operationalized, explaining the 
variable selection and creation process. The fifth and final section of the chapter will outline 
the statistical methods that are employed to test the paper’s hypotheses. 
I. Argument 
 This paper argues that Southern Africa’s dominant-party systems have shaped popular 
attitudes in the region and, further, it argues that NLM party-dominant systems have their 
own distinguishable effects. These effects are realized in two main ways. 
 First, the nature of a country’s party system largely makes an important contribution 
to shaping its institutional landscape, which is likely to affect peoples’ appraisals of their 
country’s political system. A party system, or the distribution of power between parties in a 
political system, determines whether or not certain checks on power are meaningful; indeed a 
two-thirds majority vote threshold to pass legislation matters little when one party controls 
three-quarters of the seats in the legislature. In dominant-party systems, those close to the 
governing party are likely to be quite satisfied with the status quo and not especially 
interested in imposing or protecting limitations on the ruling party’s authority. On the other 
side, the opposition groups in society that are on the outside of government looking in are 
likely to feel vulnerable, powerless, and frustrated with their semi-permanent place at the 
periphery of power. I expect that the people in this position are more likely to express greater 
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commitment to checks on the ruling party’s power and protections for the rights of 
opposition. 
 Second, the character of dominant parties, themselves, determines the nature of 
OPD’s effects on attitudes. In this paper I argue that, because of the ruling parties’ 
ideological commitments, NLM party-dominant systems will have their own unique effects 
on popular attitudes. Supporters of liberation parties are likely to exhibit some level of 
commitment to core tenets of liberation ideology. They are more likely to conflate 
democracy, national liberation, and liberation party-government than are non-supporters of 
such parties, and because of this they are likely to be less tolerant of activity perceived as 
opposing the incumbent party. Meanwhile, the liberation party’s opponents are likely to feel 
marginalized and under threat, both because of their small size and because the dominant 
party persistently characterizes them as anti-liberation. As a result, opponents of liberation 
parties will express high levels of commitment to democratic checks on power and pluralism. 
II. Hypothesis 
 The existing literature on single party-dominant systems provides some basis 
according to which Southern Africa’s party systems can be distinguished and broken down 
into three simple types or categories (fig. 2.4). For one, there are competitive systems in 
which elections produce regular transfers of power between parties. Second, there are 
dominant-party systems, defined differently by different analysts. The third and final type is 
dominant-party systems in which the dominant party has its roots as a leading liberation 
organization. This last type of party system is informed by recent work on the party politics 
of Southern Africa which emphasize the impacts that liberation parties’ histories and 
ideology have had on the way in which they’ve governed.  
 This paper will test the relationships each of these three party system types has with 
three dependent variables: demand for democracy, supply of democracy, and support for 
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pluralism. In addition to examining overall aggregate levels on each variable (fig. 2.1), the 
analysis will investigate the distribution of attitudes within each party system type by 
comparing the aggregate levels on each variable among supporters of winning and losing 
parties within each category (fig. 2.2). 
The first type of the three party system types will be referred to as competitive multi-
party (CMP). CMP systems feature regular transfer of power between parties and close 
elections; it is the kind of system democracy is expected to produce under typical 
circumstances. This paper 
hypothesizes that CMP party 
systems will feature the highest 
aggregate levels on all three 
variables. I do not expect there 
to be a disparity in levels 
between those who support 
winning parties versus those 
who support losing parties in CMP systems. 
OPD is the second category of party system. These systems are distinguished by 
extended electoral dominance by a single party and are relatively rare under normal 
conditions. Here, I anticipate lower aggregate levels on each of the variables compared to 
CMP parties. Further, I expect to find that supporters of winning parties exhibit higher 




 The third type of party system in sub-Saharan Africa is NLM party-dominant. These 
systems are identical to OPD systems but the dominant party is descendant of a NLM 
organization. These party systems are expected to deliver the lowest aggregate levels on each 
of the three dependent variables. This analysis is also expected to show significant gaps in the 
levels on each variable between supporters of winning and losing parties, with winners 
displaying lower demand for democracy and support for pluralism but higher supply of 
democracy. 
III. Definitions and Case Selection 
As was noted in the preceding chapter, political science has not reached a consensus 
regarding some the most central concepts related to OPD party systems. This section will 
offer definitions for these concepts as they are important to framing this analysis in terms of 
case selection and categorization. The implications of the definitions that have been settled 
upon will also be reviewed.  
A. Defining “Democracy”  
 On its own, a single party achieving long-term rule can be easily understood; there is 
no use reviewing the ways in which parties in autocratic governments use the law, police, and 
!
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military to impose their will. OPD systems are made interesting by the fact that long-term 
rule is combined with important features of democracy. That considered, when it comes to 
defining democracy one must not throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater; in an 
analysis that is geographically constrained to a region populated with relatively young 
democracies it is easy to be too restrictive in setting a threshold for level of democracy and 
forfeit key insights.  
 With this in mind, this paper sets what many scholars of party systems would argue is 
a low threshold for democracy in the context of the study of OPD.  In order to be included in 
this analysis, countries need only hold regular, meaningful elections and allow opposition 
parties to exist and operate. This standard ensures that all theoretically salient cases are kept 
in the study while uninteresting examples of OPD (i.e. Swaziland) are not.  
 This paper does not deny that variation in the level of democracy may predict levels 
in the dependent variables concerned. In order to control for its possible effects, democracy 
as measured by Polity rating will be used as a control variable in statistical analyses that are 
described later in the chapter.  
B. Defining and Measuring “Dominance”  
 
 An essential characteristic of OPD is that dominant parties wield unmatched political 
influence and power in the country that they govern. In order to measure the effect of OPD 
!
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party systems it is necessary to first settle upon the precise definition of “dominance” to be 
used and discuss its ramifications for the inclusion of cases. Like level of democracy, 
“political dominance” is tricky to measure and previous studies of OPD have differed in their 
approach to doing so. In this paper I will not attempt to craft a novel and universally superior 
measure of political dominance; instead, my more modest aim is to provide a reasonable 
basis by which to differentiate and classify the countries of Africa in terms of the extent to 
which their political systems are dominated by a single political party. I attempt to do this by 
developing a Dominance Index that incorporates the three main elements of dominance 
(figure 2.3). Countries’ scores on this index is one major determinant of their categorization 
in this paper’s party system typology. As noted, there are three elements to OPD. First, 
dominance implies a temporal dimension; dominant parties are those that consistently win 
elections and retain control over crucial parts of government. To account for this, part of this 





To be considered the “winner” of an election, a party must have earned a plurality of the 
popular vote and gained or retained control of the office of head of state. In countries in 
which the office of head of state is filled by a monarch or nonpartisan ceremonial figure, the 
party that control the office of head of government will be used to determine which party has 
won the election and controls government.  
In addition to duration, dominant parties are unrivaled in their power to set and carry 
out  their agendas. This component of dominance is partly reflected in the selection of control 
of the office of head of state in determining control of government, as political figureheads 
like presidents and premiers do enjoy a measure of agenda-setting power not enjoyed by 
opposition parties who tend not to. Of course outside dictatorships, executives require at least 
some sort of approval or support from a legislature. To take into account the ability of 
dominant parties to single-handedly implement their agendas, the Dominance Index subtracts 
from each country’s score the mean value of Laakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of 
Parliamentary Parties (ENPP)33 over the duration of their control of government. Countries in 
which parties have near-total control of the legislature will have smaller ENPP values, 
subtracting very little from their overall Dominance Index score. Countries in which winning 
parties fall short of a majority and are forced to govern in coalition will have higher ENPP 
values, lowering their dominance rating. 
The third and measure of dominance concerns is margin of victory. The size of the 
gap between the winning and next-closest party is an important measure of dominance 
because so much of the theory of OPD emphasizes the importance of dominant parties’ lack 
of fear of electoral defeat. Larger margins of victory are likely to embolden a party in this 
manner where narrower ones are less likely to produce such a feeling of invulnerability. The 
average margin of victory (as a fraction of one) a country’s governing party has enjoyed over 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Marrku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, “ “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, (12:1979). 
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the duration of its rule will be added in producing its Dominance Index rating. 
 Finally, how should total scores on this index be interpreted in terms of informing a 
country’s classification as either dominant or non non-dominant? As acknowledged above, 
this index is imperfect and effective use of it to differentiate between party system types 
requires careful consideration of how exactly the index takes measurements of the 
characteristic of dominance and produces a value. The best way to explore this area is with 
examples. 
 Consider for instance the fictitious case of “Country A.” Its ruling party has won only 
a single consecutive election but did so by a massive 50% of the vote. As a result, its lower 
house had an ENPP score of only 1.5. Prima facie, Country A would not be regarded as an 
example of OPD as it the ruling party has not maintained power over any length of time. 
Using this index, Country A’s overall dominance rating adds up to zero. In short, this 
example shows that, in terms of this index, a truly OPD system should, at a minimum, 
produce a positive score. Imagine, however, that Country A’s governing party had won the 
popular vote by 75% in the last election, reducing the ENPP score to 1.25. While Country A 
still falls short of a conventional, time-oriented definition OPD, the country’s dominance 
rating rises to .50. This is to say that achieving a positive dominance score is not sufficient to 
argue that particular case is OPD. It is necessary to implement a score threshold substantially 
higher than zero. For this paper, countries that receive Dominance Index ratings greater than 
1 are classified as dominant party systems. In order to receive a score of 1 or higher, a 
country will need to have a ruling party that has won, at an absolute minimum, two 
consecutive elections, regardless of ENPP (which will of course always subtract at least 1.00 
from a country’s score on the index). Those systems that meet the standard and are governed 
by a liberation party will be classified as NLM party-dominant. Countries that receive a 
Dominance Index rating of less than 1 are classified as CMP systems. 
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C. Defining “National Liberation Movement Party” 
 As noted in the review of the literature, researchers of OPD in Southern Africa have 
collectively identified a variety of OPD in the region that is referred to herein as NLM party-
dominance. In order to compare the potential effects of NLM party-dominant systems on 
popular attitudes with those of other types of party system, the standard by which NLM 
party-dominant systems are distinguished from other OPD systems must be clear. To start, an 
NLM party-dominant system must first meet all the requirements necessary to be considered 
OPD as outlined in the preceding section. From that point, whether or not a country’s party 
system is NLM party-dominant depends upon the history of both the party and the country it 
governs. 
 Although colonial and settler domination of African politics eroded quickly in the 
wake of World War II, the so-called “winds of change” failed to reach much of the southern 
part of the continent where Portugal and white minority communities clung to absolute power 
in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South Africa. In this paper, the 
term “NLM” refers to the popular, nationalist-oriented social movements that rebelled against 
these remnant colonial and white minority regimes in the latter half of the 20th century. 
Invariably, these broad-based movements were led by a small number of vanguard 
organizations. These organizations organized and mobilized their countries’ masses, led 
armed resistances, and acted as the faces of the movements both domestically and to the 
international community. In South Africa, the most notable such organization was the ANC, 
with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) being a less prominent example. In Zimbabwe, 
ZANU and ZAPU are the most prominent examples. An NLM party is one that is descendant 
of a prominent of such an organization. Thus, a country is regarded as NLM party-dominant 
if it meets the criteria to be classified as a OPD system and the governing party is 
continuation or descendant of a prominent liberation organization. 
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IV. Variables 
A. Dependent Variables:   
 This analysis will compare the levels of three dependent variables: demand for 
democracy, supply of democracy, support for pluralism. The development and construction 
of each variable is discussed below with additional details available in fig. 2.5. 
1. Demand for Democracy: 
 The first dependent variable in this analysis is demand for democracy. Democratic 
demand (or democratic legitimacy) measures popular belief that democracy both is the best 
available form of government. The variable is included here because it is widely thought to 
be a critically important attitudinal factor for producing stable democracy.34    
 Transforming the idea of demand for democracy into a workable dependent variable 
is possible using survey data. In this analysis, demand for democracy is measured using an 
index of the same name that was first developed and employed by Mattes Bratton.35 The 
authors argue that a measure of demand for democracy should not only include measures of 
abstract support for democracy but also support for democracy in relation to possible 
alternatives to democratic government.36  
 The index is constructed from a battery of four items included in the Afrobarometer 
survey (see: fig. 2.5). The first of the four items that comprise the demand for democracy 
index respondents the degree to which they prefer democracy to alternatives in the abstract. 
The item, which was originally developed and used by the Latinobarometro, provides 
respondents with three statements about democracy. Each statement represents a different 
level of support for democratic government ranging from total support for democracy and 
complete intolerance for any other kind of regime to at one end of the spectrum to total 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Larry Diamond, Political Culture 
35 Mattes, R., Bratton, M., “Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, 
and Experience,” American Journal of Political Science, (51:2007), 204. 
36 Ibid., 193. 
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indifference regarding regime type at the other. Respondents are then asked which of the 
three statements is most similar to their own view of democracy. Those who refuse to answer 
or “don’t know” are excluded from the analysis. 
The responses are coded for inclusion into the demand for democracy index by 
ranking each of the three statements in terms of the relative level of enthusiasm for 
democracy it indicates. A value of 2 is given to respondents who express complete support 
for democracy while a value of 1 is given to those respondents who express partial support 
for democracy (i.e., suggest that non-democratic government is “sometimes preferable”). 
Those who report believing that regime type simply does not matter to them are given a value 
of zero for the item. 
The second, third, and fourth items used in the demand for democracy index are a 
series of related items designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes toward democracy in relation 
to real-world alternative regime-types. Respondents are told to indicate the degree to which 
they would approve or disapprove of the following regime types along a Likert Scale ranging 
from strongly approve to strongly disapprove. The first in this series of three items, 
Afrobarometer item Q29a, asks how approving the respondent would be of a political system 
in which only one party was permitted to hold office. The second item inquires about 
approval of the possibility of rule by the military. The third and final alternative regime type 
asked about in the series asks about approval or disapproval of rule by a single person. The 
appropriateness of the use of these four items for a single index has been verified by factor 
and reliability analyses which can be reviewed in full in the appendices.37 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See results for these analyses in Appendix 1. 
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2. Supply of Democracy
The supply of democracy is designed to measure the extent to which a respondent 
believes their country is a democracy. It is developed using an Afrobarometer item which 
asks respondents to rate the level of democracy in their country on a Likert-like scale from 
“not at all democratic” to “a full democracy.” The five possible responses are coded with a 
value from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate a more generous evaluation of the country’s 
level of democracy.  
3. Support for Pluralism
The support for pluralism variable is constructed as an index composed of a series of 
nine Afrobarometer items which can be viewed in fig. 2.5. The related items all ask 
respondents about their views of how the political system ought to function, with particular 
focus on the normative role of various political offices as well as opposition parties and the 
press. The use of these items as an index is supported by factor and reliability analyses. 
Additional information about each item as well as the analyses that justify their use as an 
index can be viewed in Appendix 1. 
B. Independent Variables
1. Party system type
The most theoretically important independent variable in this study is party system-
type. The way by which this variable is constructed was discussed in this chapter’s earlier 
discussion of key definitions and concepts (section III). Refer to figure 2.4 for additional 
information regarding the categorization of cases. 
2. Winner/Loser
This analysis also examines the differences in attitudes exhibited by supporters and 
opponents of the governing party. This variable is constructed using two Afrobarometer 
items which ask respondents if they are “close to” a political party and, if so, which political 
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party it is. This variable classifies respondents into one of three categories. Respondents who 
report being close to the country’s governing party are coded into the “winner” category. 
Respondents who report being close to any other party are coded into the “loser” category. 
People who refuse to respond to either question or report that they are not close to a political 
party are coded as being “unaffiliated.”  
3. Control Variables: 
 This analysis incorporates four control variables in an effort to determine if party 
systems have an effect on the aforementioned dependent variables over and above the effects 
explained by the factors that are generally considered to shape them.  
i. Democracy (Polity Ratings) 
 This analysis uses Polity’s country ratings for 2008, the year the attitudinal data was 
collected, as a control variable. Democracy is included as a control because, in contrast to 
other research on OPD, this analysis chooses to set a low threshold for democracy as far as 
case selection is concerned. This decision has the effect of creating more variance among the 
included cases than typically exists in this kind of research, so to ensure that any differences 
in mass attitudes that are uncovered are in fact the result of party system, level of democracy 








ii. Lived poverty 
 The lived poverty variable is an index designed to account for variation in material 
conditions. Additional information concerning the construction of this variable is available 
for review in fig. 2.5. 
iii. Education 
 The education control variable is a measure of the highest level of education a 
respondent has completed. This analysis uses an Afrobarometer item described in fig. 2.5. 
iv. Urban/Rural 
 This analysis controls for urban versus rural residency by including an Afrobarometer 
item that indicates whether a respondent was interviewed in the polling organization’s urban 
or rural primary sampling unit. 
V.  Methodology 
 This section will offer an overview of the statistical tests and procedures that are used 
to test this paper’s hypotheses. The analysis employs three basic tests. The first two are 
designed to compare popular attitudes across different kinds of party systems. The second 
test concerns the distribution of attitudes within party system types, aggregating the data by 
party association. The third and final test will measure the ability of party system type to 
predict change in the selected dependent variables even while controlling for other potentially 
important factors. 
A. Comparing Attitudes Across Party System Types 
 The analysis will compare the mean levels of demand for democracy, supply of 
democracy, and support for pluralism across each of the three party system types identified 
above. 
1. Conducting the Analysis:  
 SPSS will be used to conduct a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test and a 
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measure of effect size (eta). The party system variable will be input as the factor while each 
of the dependent variables will be entered as dependents.  
2. Evaluating the Results:  
 Findings that reveal pattern of attitudes across party system types that are both 
consistent with the hypotheses set out section II or this chapter and statistically significant 
would support this paper’s broader contention that party systems have shaped mass attitudes 
in Southern Africa. 
B. Comparing Attitudes Within Party System Types: Winners versus Losers 
 This test compares the distribution of attitudes within each party system type. 
Specifically, it is designed to determine if there is a statistically significant difference in the 
level of demand for democracy, supply of democracy, or support for pluralism between 
supporters of the winning and losing parties’ in their country’s last election. 
1. Conducting the Analysis: 
 As in the preceding test, SPSS will be used to conduct a one-way ANOVA and 
produce a measure of effect size (eta). This time, however, a separate ANOVA will be 
performed for each of the three party system types and the winner/loser party affiliation 
variable will serve as the factor. As before, demand for democracy, supply of democracy, and 
support for pluralism will be included as dependent variables. 
2. Evaluating the Results: 
 The results of this test will be compared with the hypotheses laid out in figure 2.3. If 
the tests reveals a pattern consistent with those patterns and the differences are shown to be 
significantly significant, the findings will support the hypothesis. If the relative levels on the 
dependent variables are not aligned with the paper’s expectations or differences in means fall 
short of statistical significance, the null hypothesis will not have been falsified. 
 
 33 
C. Multiple Linear Regressions 
  This series of tests is designed to determine if the relationship between party system 
and the three dependent variables are spurious by controlling for the influence of other 
potential explanatory factors that could falsify this paper’s core hypotheses. 
1. Conducting the Analysis: 
 This series of regressions will be conducted using SPSS. In each test, one of the three 
dependent variables (demand for democracy, supply of democracy, support for pluralism) 
will be entered as the dependent variable. The two party system dummy variables measuring 
the effects of OPD and NLM party-dominant systems, respectively, will be entered as 
independent variables along with the demographic variables which serve as controls.  
2. Evaluating the Results: 
 Interpreting the results of the regressions will be straightforward. If the introduction 
of control variables reduces the explanatory power of party system to below significance, the 
hypothesis is falsified. If, however, the regressions show the party system variable remains a 
significant predictor of change in the dependent variable, the analysis supports the argument 
that party systems do have an independent effect on these attitudes. 
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Chapter 3: Research Findings 
The third chapter of this paper will begin with a brief descriptive overview of the 
values for the selected variables across the included cases. Next, the results of the statistical 
analyses concerning the relationship between these variables and party system type will be 
reviewed. 
I. Descriptive Statistics
Before delving into comparisons of means and regression analysis it is useful to 
establish a bit of context by first looking at some of the raw descriptive data. Figure 3.1 lists 
the mean and standard deviation for seven of the key variables used in this analysis. The 
mean score for demand for democracy, measured here by an index on which scores range 
from 0 to 3.5, is nearly 2.75 with the bulk of respondents scoring within .74 points of that 
score. On supply of democracy, measured here on a scale from 1 to 4, the mean score is 2.84, 
the equivalent of a respondent reporting her or his country is a “flawed” democracy. The 
score seems to suggest that many Africans are very sober in their assessments of the quality 
of democracy in their countries. The mean score on the support for pluralism index used in 
this paper (which runs from 0 to 4) is 2.53. The table lists mean scores on three independent 
!
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variables. On the lived poverty index, the mean score was 1.29 out of a possible 4, while the 
mean score on level of education was 3.35, where a score of 3 indicates completion of 
primary education. Regarding education, however, responses were widely dispersed with a 
standard deviation 4.16. The level of democracy variable, which is a country’s Polity score 
for 2008, had a mean of 5.74 on a scale of -10 to 10. As in the case of the education variable, 
there was significant dispersion as the standard deviation was 3.2. 
 Figure 3.2 offers an overview of the bivariate relationships between each of the seven 
variables discussed above as well as the two dummy party system variables. While there are 
lots of statistically significant bivariate correlations between the variables, the data reveals 







II. Comparing Levels of Key Attitudes
A. Across Party-System Types
1. Demand for Democracy
Before conducting this test, I hypothesized that the mean level demand for democracy 
would be highest in competitive democracies, lower in countries with OPD party systems, 
and lowest in countries with party systems that are dominated by liberation parties. 
This analysis reveals that, indeed, demand for democracy is highest in competitive 
party systems at a raw mean score of 2.83 on the scale used here. Following closely behind 
CMP systems are countries with OPD systems where the mean level of demand for 
democracy score is just under 2.8 out of a possible 3.5. There is a much larger gap between 
the mean level of demand for democracy in OPD systems and demand in NLM party-
dominant systems, where the average score on the index is nearly 10% lower than in 
competitive systems. Further, scores varied more widely in NLM party-dominant systems 
than in either CMP or OPD systems, with a standard deviation nearly 20% greater than 
among scores for CMP systems and more than 11% greater than OPD systems. Figure 3.4 
!
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shows that these differences of means between groups are indeed statistically significant at 














2. Supply of Democracy 
 
 In chapter two I predicted that, in each of the three party system types, I would find 
roughly equivalent assessments of the level of democracy. In competitive systems, I expected 
that closer elections and periodic transfers of power would result in high evaluations of the 
supply of democracy. Conversely, in both OPD and NLM party-dominant systems I 
suspected that the widespread appeal of the governing party would generate generous 
assessments of a country’s level of democracy. 
 Respondents across each of the three types of party systems appear to have moderated 
views on the quality of their country’s democracy as mean levels on the supply of democracy 
variable fail to surpass a score of 3 (indicating a “flawed” democracy on a 1-4 scale) in any 
of the party system types. Still, as was the case for mean levels of demand for democracy, 
those people residing in CMP systems offered higher evaluations of the supply of democracy 
than respondents living in either OPD or NLM party-dominant party systems. The party 
system with the next-highest mean score on the variable is OPD, where the average score is 
.16 points lower on the scale being used. Respondents in NLM party-dominant systems were 
offered the least favorable evaluations of the extent of democracy in their countries, although 
the gap between scores in those systems and the mean score in OPD systems was less than 
!
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one-fifth the size of the gap between OPD and competitive systems. These differences in 
means are statistically significant at the p < .001 level. However, the effect size is small with 
an eta value of .072.  
 
3. Support for Pluralism 
 In this paper’s second chapter I hypothesized that respondents living in countries with 
CMP systems would express the highest level of support for pluralism. In addition, I 
expected people in NLM party-dominant systems to offer the lowest level of support for 
pluralism, thinking that members of societies led by liberation parties may, through some 
kind of unknown socialization process, possess the same beliefs and understanding of 
national history that scholars like Southall argue characterize the ideology of the liberation 
!
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parties themselves.38 Finally, I expected this test to show that OPD systems lie in between 
these two extremes. 
The mean score on the support for pluralism index was highest in CMP systems at 
just under 2.69, approximately the midpoint on the 0 to 4 scale developed for use in this 
paper. Respondents living in OPD systems exhibited the second highest mean level of 
support for pluralism while respondents in NLM party-dominant systems produced the 
lowest mean score for support for pluralism at approximately 2.35, just above the midpoint 
on the scale. As in the instances of the two preceding means comparisons, these differences 
between groups proved to be statistically significant at the p < .001 level. The eta of .212 
shows a considerable effect size. 
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B. Within Types of Party Systems: Winners versus Losers 
1. Demand for Democracy 
 I hypothesized that, in NLM party-dominant party systems, individuals affiliated with 
governing parties would express lower levels of of demand for democracy than would those 
people who support losing parties. Further, I suspected that partisanship would not have a 
strong effect on the variable in countries with either CMP or OPD party systems. 
 This analysis shows that, in all three party system types concerned here, partisanship 
and demand for democracy are indeed related at a statistically significant level. In CMP 
systems, respondents who reported any partisan affiliation whatsoever expressed higher 
levels of demand for democracy than did their unaffiliated peers. Those respondents who 
reported an affiliation with the governing party in particular exhibited the highest demand for 





 Likewise, those respondents living in countries with OPD systems who reported a 
partisan affiliation of any kind did, on average, express greater support for democracy than 
those respondents who reported no affiliation. However, unlike in CMP systems, those 
people close to the losing party reported the highest mean level of demand for democracy. As 
was before, the effect of partisanship was small with an eta of .087. 
 Something different is taking place in NLM party-dominant systems. There, 
partisanship of any kind was associated with slightly lower levels of demand for democracy. 
Furthermore, it was those respondents who claim to be strong supporters of the dominant 
governing party that expressed the lowest mean level of demand for democracy. Still, as was 









2. Supply of Democracy
As laid out in chapter two, I expected to find that partisanship would prove related to 
how individuals living in OPD and NLM party-dominant systems evaluated the supply of 
democracy in their country. I anticipated that, in both system types, winners would be more 
generous in their assessments and that losers would describe their system as less democratic. 
In all the three types of party systems partisanship of all kinds was shown to be 
related to higher evaluations of the supply of democracy in one’s country. Additionally, 
respondents in all three party system types that claimed an affiliation with winning parties 
expressed higher evaluations of the supply of democracy than did the respondents reporting 
either a closeness with losing parties or no partisan affiliation whatsoever. 
In CMP and NLM party-dominant systems, the relationship was weak with eta values 
at .075 and .116 respectively. The effect of partisanship on evaluations of the supply of 
democracy was much more pronounced in OPD systems where the effect size as measured by 
eta was .309.  
!
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3. Support for Pluralism
I hypothesized that levels of support for pluralism would be close to even across 
parties in CMP and OPD systems but widely disparate in NLM party-dominant systems. 
Specifically, I expected to find that supporters of losing parties in NLM party-dominant 
systems would exhibit higher level of support relative to the supporters of the dominant 
liberation party. 
The results show that, in both CMP and OPD systems, partisan affiliation appears to 
be related to levels of support for pluralism with respondents affiliated with any party 
reporting higher levels than their non-affiliated peers. In both cases those respondents 
affiliated with losing parties scored highest on the support for pluralism index, but the effect 
sizes were very small at an eta of .055 in CMP systems and .076 in OPD systems. In contrast, 
the analysis revealed no statistically significant relationship between partisanship of any kind 
and support for pluralism in NLM party-dominant systems.  
!
 45 
III. Multiple Linear Regression 
 The next series of tests aims to determine if the relationships between party systems 
and key attitudinal variables revealed in the preceding means comparisons hold up while 
accounting for other potential explanatory factors. Figure 3.12 shows the order and way by 
which the variables were entered in each regression analysis. The first test looks at demand 
for democracy as the dependent variable while the second and third examine supply of 
democracy and pluralism, respectively. 
1. Demand for Democracy 
 
 The first regression model concerns demand for democracy and the overall model 
manages to account for 4% of the variation in the variable, attaining significance at the p < 
.001 level (fig. 3.12).  The coefficients table (fig. 3.13) shows that, even with the inclusion of 
all the control variables, each party system dummy variable remains a statistically significant 
predictor of levels of demand for democracy. The NLM party-dominant system dummy 
variable produces, in absolute terms, the largest beta value at -.200. In contrast, the OPD 
system dummy is shown to have a weaker relationship with the dependent variable with a 
beta of -.052. 
!
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2. Supply of Democracy
The second regression model suggests that party system type offers little value in 
terms of predicting change in popular assessments of the supply of democracy in a given 
country. Figure 3.26 shows that, even with demographic variables, the overall model 
manages to explain only 3% of the variance in evaluations of the supply of democracy. A 
subsequent block-wise regression analysis in which the two party system dummy variables 
are entered independently and after all other controls revealed that they combine to contribute 




 The coefficients table (figure 3.15) shows that the OPD system dummy variable is the 
only one included in the model that fails to achieve significance. Additionally, the variables 
with the largest beta values are preexisting level of democracy and lived poverty at .123 and -
.096, respectively. On the other hand, while the NLM party-dominant system dummy 
variable is a statistically significant predictor of change in respondents’ evaluations of the 
supply of democracy in their country, its beta value is the smallest among the significant 











3. Support for Pluralism
This regression model proved considerably more effective at explaining change in 
levels of support for pluralism than either of the two preceding dependent variables, 
managing to account for more than 9% of variation in levels of support for pluralism. 
Furthermore, where the party system dummy variables contributed less than .03 to the R 
square values in the regression analyses concerning demand for and supply of democracy, a 
follow-up block-wise regression for this model showed that the dummies combined to 
account for nearly 8% of the 9.4% of variance explained by this model. The NLM party-
dominant system dummy alone nearly quadrupled the explanatory power of the model when 
it was introduced in the final block. 
Table 3.17 further illustrates the importance of the NLM party-dominant system 
dummy variable. At -.303, its beta value is the largest of any variable included in the model. 
The OPD system variable produced the second largest beta value at -.235, followed closely 
by the level of formal democracy variable. The three demographic controls included in the 







Chapter 4: Discussion 
This paper is an attempt to provide preliminary answers to two questions. The first 
question asks what effects Southern Africa’s dominant party systems may have on popular 
attitudes across the region. Secondly, do OPD systems in which the dominant party is a 
descendent of a national liberation movement have their own distinguishable effects on mass 
attitudes? The second chapter laid out some expectations rooted in existing scholarship on the 
subject, highlighted by several core hypotheses, and the third provided the results of various 
statistical analyses designed to produce some clarity. The fourth and final chapter of this 
dissertation seeks to tie it all together and will consider the implications this paper’s results have 
with regard to these questions and evaluate those hypotheses. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the broader significance these findings may have for future investigations of 
dominant party systems and their relationships with mass attitudes. 
I. Prolonged Dominance by Single Parties Impacts Popular Attitudes
The data offers compelling evidence in support of the claim that dominant party systems 
are related to popular attitudes. However, the results from the third chapter also suggest that the 
relationship is just one part of a much broader network of factors that produce the attitudinal 
landscapes of Southern Africa’s societies. In short, the answer to the first research question 
behind this dissertation is a qualified “yes.” For two of the three attitudinal variables highlighted 
in this research, both the means comparisons and the linear regression models provide strong 
and clear evidence that political attitudes are shaped in part by the kind of party system in which 
a respondent lives.  
Figures 3.3 and 3.6 concisely illustrate the effect party systems have on demand for 
democracy. The differences across party system types, while small in absolute terms, are all 
statistically significant. As can be seen in figure 3.5, the effect size (eta) of the party system 
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variable is .024, meaning approximately 2.4% of variation in level of demand for democracy is 
explained by the kind of party system in which one resides. 
The importance of party system type in the bigger picture of explaining variance in 
demand for democracy party system type was further supported by the results of the linear 
regression analysis conducted in this paper. The test showed that demographic variables and the 
pre-existing level of formal democracy combined to account for less than 1% of variance while 
the party system dummies more than quadrupled the model’s R-squared from .009 to .040 
(figure 3.27). The fact that the bulk of that increase was derived from the inclusion of the 
dummy variable for NLM party-dominant systems in the fourth block of the model will be 
discussed further in the following section. 
Dominant party systems were shown to have a more pronounced impact on a country’s 
level of support for pluralism. The results of means comparisons in figures 3.11 and 3.14 show 
that support for pluralism is substantially lower in those countries dominated by single parties 
than in societies with competitive party systems and the effect size of party system type on 
support for pluralism was nearly twice that for demand for democracy (fig. 3.13). The results of 
the regression analysis corroborate that result as figures 3.31 and 3.32 show the model’s overall 
R-squared jump to .094 with the inclusion of the two party system dummies, an increase of .077
over the model when it consisted of only demographic controls and pre-existing level of 
democracy. Collectively, these analyses support the contention that there is in fact a disparity in 
support for pluralism across party system types and that the existence of these disparities is 
partly attributable to the party systems and not simply some sort of underlying demographic 
factor. 
The evidence regarding the potential effects of dominance on popular evaluations of the 
extent of democracy was by far the least compelling among the three attitudinal variables 
studied here. The cross-system means comparisons revealed statistically significant disparity in 
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the mean evaluation of the supply of democracy between CMP systems and both OPD and 
NLM party-dominant systems (fig. 3.10) but no such difference between the two varieties of 
dominant-party systems. Further, the effect size of party system type came to be .005, much 
lower than for either demand for democracy or support for pluralism. The regression analysis for 
supply of democracy underscores the irrelevance of party system type for evaluations of the 
supply of democracy. Figure 3.29 shows that both party system type dummy variables combine 
to contribute a mere .001 increase to the model’s overall R-squared. However, the fact that this 
analysis includes so many respondents means that even a difference as miniscule as .001 
registers as statistically significant. 
These results are largely consistent with the hypotheses laid out in chapter two. Both 
demand for democracy and  support for pluralism did in fact prove to be highest in CMP 
systems and lowest in NLM party-dominant systems. The story is a little more complex with 
regard to interpreting the results for supply of democracy. On the one hand, there are statistically 
significant disparities in the aggregate means across the party system types. However, the 
regression analysis seems to clearly indicate that the inclusion of basic control variables 
eliminates the bulk of the difference. 
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II. The Nature of Dominance Matters
The results of the means comparison tests reviewed in the third chapter also suggest 
that the nature of a party’s dominance does in fact have a unique and discernable effect on 
popular attitudes in a given country. Put differently, the results of this study lend support to 
the argument that the theoretical distinction between OPD and dominance by parties 
descended from NLMs appears to have implications for popular attitudes. 
The differing impacts of OPD and NLM-party dominance are visible in the aggregate 
levels of demand for democracy. In terms of the raw scale used in the demand for democracy 
index, the gap between the mean in OPD systems and NLM party-dominant systems is 
approximately eight times larger than the gap between OPD and CMP systems (fig 3.3). In 
the regression model, adding the OPD system dummy variable in the third block of 
independent variables increased the R-squared of the overall model by .002. In contrast, 
including the NLM-party dummy in the fourth and final block raised the R-squared by .030 
(fig. 3.27). These pieces of data support the argument that dominance alone and dominance 
by NLM parties have distinct effects on popular demand for democracy. 
The pattern is similar with regard to aggregate levels of support for pluralism. As 
before, there is a statistically significant difference in means between OPD and NLM party-
dominant systems (fig. 3.14) with the latter producing the lower mean level on the variable. 
The regression analysis also helps clarify the different impacts of these two kinds of 
dominant party systems. The third block of independent variables, which consists only of the 
OPD dummy, contributed .008 to the R-squared of the overall model. The subsequent 
addition of the NLM party-dominant system dummy added an additional .069 beyond what 
was supplied from demographics, democracy, and the OPD dummy.  
Supply of democracy was an exception. These statistical tests failed to detect any 
substantial impact of party system type (dominant or competitive) on popular evaluations of 
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the supply of democracy. This result is basically consistent with what was hypothesized in 
chapter two.  
III. One’s Relationship to the Dominant Party Matters
This analysis gives reason to believe that attitudes in OPD systems may be affected 
by an individual’s position in relation to the party in power. In other words, the extent to 
which a person demands democracy, exhibits support for pluralism, and evaluates the quality 
of democracy in her or his country is, in part, a product of their relationship with the 
dominant party. However, the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear and additional 
research is needed in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the role partisanship 
plays in shaping mass attitudes in dominant party systems. 
The data reveals attitudinal disparities between those associated with winning and 
losing parties exists across all three party system types examined here, competitive systems 
included. However, the pattern in which these disparities emerged and their varying sizes are 
inconsistent with the hypotheses articulated in figure 2.2.  
First consider the results concerning mean levels of demand for democracy. To begin, 
the effect size as measured in terms of eta failed to surpass .09 in any party system type, 
meaning that partisanship is failing to account for even 1% of the variation in respondents’ 
level of demand for democracy in the context of any of the systems. To the extent that party 
systems do have an effect, the results bear out the expectation that losers in NLM party-
dominant systems would have the highest level of demand for democracy. However, in 
violation of this paper’s initial expectations, losers expressing higher demand for democracy 
wasn’t unique to NLM party-dominant systems. Indeed the effect size of partisanship was 
larger in the context of OPD systems where the hypothesis anticipated roughly equivalent 
evaluations. This being acknowledged, these differences are miniscule and contribute little to 
any explanation of attitude formation. 
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The findings with regard to evaluations of the supply of democracy were somewhat 
clearer and more in-line with my hypotheses. The data revealed the pattern of disparities that 
had been anticipated in chapter two in both OPD and NLM party-dominant systems with 
respondents close to winning parties expressing the most favorable view of their country’s 
democracy. As expected, the gap between winners and losers was narrowest in competitive 
systems. The effect sizes were also much larger than they were for demand for democracy 
reaching an eta at .309 in OPD systems and .116 in NLM party-dominant systems (fig. 3.10). 
Perhaps the most surprising results were for support for pluralism, where the paper’s 
hypotheses were shown to be completely misguided. In CMP and OPD systems the 
expectation was that there would be no meaningful difference in levels of support for 
pluralism between supporters and opponents of the governing party. As it turned out, the data 
showed statistically significant differences in means in both those systems and no such 
!
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difference in NLM party-dominant systems, where I hypothesized such a difference would be 
most stark. 
IV. Possible Implications for Future Research
The fact that the body of literature on the discrete effects of different kinds of 
dominant party systems on political attitudes in Southern Africa is still emerging has been 
noted throughout this paper. This work offers reason to believe that the relationship merits 
further attention and provides two primary pieces of direction for future inquiries.  
Firstly, this analysis does not show a clear or theoretically obvious pattern in the 
differences in attitudes expressed by respondents affiliated with winning and losing parties in 
dominant systems that is distinct from the patterns that are found within competitive systems. 
This finding suggests that dominant party systems are not shaping attitudes by somehow 
transforming or distorting the institutional landscape. Put differently, the experience or 
prospect of long-time access to or absence from political power does not appear to be a 
primary driver of attitudinal disparities in the collection of countries studied here. 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that a rational choice-centric explanation that emphasizes the 
way long-term power imbalances shape incentives is perhaps not the most promising 
direction to go from here. Instead it might be worth investigating the potential for parties to 
be socializing voters and instilling in their supporters certain attitudes. 
The second key takeaway is that the results of these statistical tests seem to indicate 
that, of the three party systems types studied here, it is the effect of NLM-party dominance 
that has the most powerful effect of the three party systems on popular attitudes. In the cases 
of both demand for democracy and support for pluralism, the NLM dummy variable 
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